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Alive Not Dead: The Revival of
Redevelopment Post-Matosantos
by HELEN LUU CHOU*
Introduction
In the 2011 case of California Redevelopment Association v.
Matosantos, the California Supreme Court eliminated redevelopment
agencies in the state.! Created after World War II, these
redevelopment agencies' purpose was to eradicate and redevelop
blighted communities, and has been part of the local government
landscape for over six decades.! From 2009 to 2010, over eighty
percent of California's 480 cities and thirty-one of the state's fifty-
eight counties had a redevelopment agency, totaling about 425
redevelopment agencies throughout the state.! Redevelopment
agencies were credited for creating Hollywood, San Diego's Gaslamp
Quarter, a large number of office towers highlighting city skylines,
large industrial and commercial spaces, and affordable housing units.!
Not only do redevelopment agencies improve the city landscape, but
they also generate economic activity. The Center for Economic
Development ("CED") estimated that every dollar spent on
* J.D. 2014, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 2008, Mass
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1. Cal. Redev. Ass'n v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th 231,262 (2011).
2. Id. at 245-46.
3. Peter Detwiler, Broken Promises: The End of California Redevelopment, 64
PLAN. & ENVTL. L. No. 6, 2012, at 4.
4. Id.; Billy Hamilton, The Fight for Hollywood's Soul: Redevelopment and
Incentives, 64 ST. TAX NOTES, Apr. 30, 2012, at 321.
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redevelopment projects led to about fourteen dollars in in-state sales
of goods and services.
In 2011, the California state government faced a $25 billion
budget deficit.' As a result, the California Legislature passed two
bills, Assembly Bill 1X 26 ("AB 1X 26") and Assembly Bill 1X 27
("AB 1X 27"), hoping to divert funds from redevelopment agencies
to school districts and special districts.! The two bills were challenged
in the California Supreme Court.! In December 2011, the Court ruled
that AB 1X 27 was unconstitutional, but held that AB 1X 26 was
constitutional Despite the California Supreme Court's clear ruling
on the constitutionality of AB 1X 26, lawsuits have since erupted
challenging the constitutionality of AB 1X 26 on different grounds.o
The Matosantos decision led to dissension within California as
city officials opposed the dissolution of redevelopment agencies, and
blamed the dissolutions for their cities' economic woes." While
redevelopment was problematic and controversial prior to
Matosantos, city officials cited the elimination of redevelopment
agencies as the cause for bankruptcies, fiscal emergencies, and
uncompleted development projects.12 For example, Culver City
planned to declare a fiscal emergency and raised taxes because of the
lost revenue caused by the dissolution of redevelopment agencies.1
Cities such as Stockton, Mammoth Lakes, and San Bernardino
claimed that the "state raid on redevelopment funds helped push
them over the brink" and into bankruptcy.14 These problems caused
by the eradication of redevelopment agencies highlight these
5. Estimates based on data from the 2002-2003 fiscal year. Andrew Schouten, Clear
as Mud: Chapter 98 and California's Community Redevelopment Law, 38 MCGEORGE L.
REv. 216,216 (2007) (internal citation omitted).
6. Marc M. Schneier, California Supreme Court Rules that Redevelopment Agencies
Are Not Constitutionally Immune from Dissolution by the Legislature, 33 No. 3
CONSTRUCTION LITIG. REP. 15 (2012).
7. Id.
8. See Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th at 242.
9. Id.
10. See League of California Cities, Statewide Summary of Redevelopment Litigation
(Feb. 2014), available at www.cacities.orgfUploadedFiles/Leaguelnternet/7d/7dlle9fe-
c72e-47c8-81c3-ea5390299e4e.pdf (listing the lawsuits that have been filed concerning
redevelopment).
11. See generally Billy Hamilton, The Mermaid's Tale: California's Redevelopment
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agencies' importance within California's economy and also explain
why organizations and local governments are trying to revive
redevelopment by filing lawsuits to challenge the constitutionality of
AB 1X 26.
This Note examines the state of redevelopment after the
California Supreme Court's decision in Matosantos. It also looks at
the constitutionality of AB 1X 26 and its subsequent "clean up" bill,
AB 1484. Part I provides a brief history of redevelopment in
California and the financing scheme for rdevelopment. Part II looks
at the events giving rise to AB 1X 26 and AB 1X 27 and details the
California Supreme Court's decision in Matosantos. Part III discusses
the state of redevelopment post-Matosantos and describes the clean
up bill, AB 1484. Part IV surveys the different redevelopment
lawsuits currently pending in California courts and discusses the
constitutional and legal issues at the center of these lawsuits. Finally,
Part V analyzes the legal arguments regarding the constitutionality of
AB 1X 26 and AB 1484, such as: (1) whether reduced bond ratings of
municipal bonds constitute an impairment of contracts; (2) whether
the failure to honor existing obligations is an impairment of contracts;
(3) whether the penalties imposed by AB 1484 violated the California
Constitution regarding sales, use, and property taxes; and (4) whether
AB 1484 violated the non-delegation doctrine.
I. Redevelopment Agencies in California
In 1945, through the Community Redevelopment Act, the
California Legislature created redevelopment agencies ("RDAs") to
improve blighted communities in the interest of the "health, safety,
and welfare" of the people in California." RDAs were administered
through local sponsoring agencies, which were tasked with preparing
and carrying out "plans for improvement, rehabilitation, and
redevelopment of blighted areas."" A local agency could acquire real
property through the power of eminent domain, dispose of property
by lease or sale without public bidding, clear land and construct
infrastructure necessary for building on project sites, and undertake
certain improvements to other facilities in the area."
15. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33037(a), (c) (2014). See also id. § 33000.
16. Id. § 33131(a).
17. Schneier, supra note 6. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 33391(b), 33420,
33421, 33430, 33431, 33445 (2014).
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Though redevelopment officially began in 1945, its
implementation stalled until 1952 due to lack of funding.'" In 1952,
California voters passed a bill to help finance redevelopment." As a
result of that bill, Article XIII, section 19 was added to the California
Constitution, which created a tax increment funding ("TIF") scheme
to help finance redevelopment.20 Under the TIEF scheme, RDAs
would be funded through tax revenue generated by the increased
value of redeveloped property.21
Through the TIF framework, public entities receiving property
tax revenue for RDAs would be "allocated a portion [of the property
tax revenue] based on the assessed value of the property prior to the
effective date of the redevelopment plan."22 The tax increments that
RDAs received were based on the taxes collected on real property
within the redevelopment area "that exceed[ed] the property taxes
received in the tax year prior to the redevelopment plan's adoption.""
Once the property taxes in the redevelopment area were collected,
the revenue was split between the taxing agency and the RDA.24 The
taxing agency would receive the revenue it would have received
under a value that was assessed at the time the city started the
redevelopment project; the RDA would receive the tax revenue that
was in excess of the assessed value distributed to the other taxing
entities.' This was based on the belief that the increased value was
the result of redevelopment. 26 Consequently, RDAs would receive an
increasing proportion of tax revenue, whereas other agencies' tax
revenue would remain the same.27 The increment the RDAs received
would be "deposited into a special fund" that would be used to pay
off debt the RDA incurred.?
In a way, TIF was "self-financing" because the "incremental
revenues that [were] generated [were] used to pay for the program
18. Detwiler, supra note 3, at 5.
19. Id.; Schouten, supra note 5, at 220.
20. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 16 (2014).
21. Daniel S. Maroon, Redevelopment in the Golden State: A Study in Plenary Power
Under the California Constitution, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 453, 455 (2013).
22. Cal. Redev. Ass'n v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th 231, 246 (2011).
23. Schouten, supra note 5, at 220.
24. Id. at 220-21.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 221; Maroon, supra note 21, at 455.
27. See id.
28. Schouten, supra note 5, at 221.
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that spurred the growth."" To illustrate,3o assuming the value of a
property is $100,000, this would generate $1,000 in property taxes
(based on property tax rate of one percent). After redevelopment,
the property value increased to $1,000,000 and would therefore
generate $10,000 in property taxes. The taxing agencies in the
redevelopment area, such as the city, school district, or other would
still receive $1,000 of the property taxes divided amongst all the
taxing agencies. The additional $9,000 in property taxes would all go
to the RDA. Funds generated through the TIF were to be spent on
redevelopment "that largely benefit the project area," such as
creating sidewalks and other "improvements that a private developer
would otherwise build."" Twenty percent of the TIF funds were to be
used to construct low- and moderate-income housing.32
H. Matosantos and Prior Events
A. Budget Crisis in California
Although the TIF funding scheme undoubtedly led to increased
economic and redevelopment activity, it has also been criticized."
Because of the TIF scheme, RDAs received a disproportionate
amount of real property taxes at the expense of school districts and
special districts as money was essentially diverted from local
governments to the RDAs." This problem was exacerbated by the
passage of Proposition 13 (codified as Article XIIIA of the California
Constitution) in 1978, which capped property tax rates at one
percent.35 As a result, funds from the property tax that were
distributed to local governments declined by sixty percent." More
importantly, this meant that the California state government bore the
burden of meeting the mandatory funding levels for public schools
required by the California Constitution via Proposition 98.3 This
29. Maroon, supra note 21, at 455.
30. The numbers in this hypothetical are based on the hypothetical found in
Schouten, supra note 5, at 221.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Hamilton, supra note 11.
34. Id.
35. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §1(a) (2014). See also Schouten, supra note 5, at 220;
Maroon, supra note 21, at 460.
36. Schouten, supra note 5, at 222.
37. Id.; Cal. Redev. Ass'n v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th 231, 245 (2011). In 1988,
Proposition 98 amended the California Constitution to add minimum funding levels for
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posed a real problem for local governments, such as counties, cities,
school districts, community college districts, and special districts that
depended on the incremental tax revenue to provide vital public
services." Under the California Constitution, these forms of local
governments could not receive any funds from the property tax
increment until the RDA closed its project area."
While RDAs received about $1.9 billion in property tax
increment revenues from 1999-2000, that number grew to about $5.4
billion in 2009-2010, with unmatured tax allocation bonds of $19.1
billion." The amount received by RDAs grew significantly while the
numbers for other local governments remained the same.4' From
1982-1983, RDAs only received 3.6 percent of the total property tax
revenues.42 By 2009-2010, RDAs were receiving twelve percent of
total property tax revenue.43
B. AB LX 26 and AB IX 27: Potential Solutions to Budgetary
Problems
In response to the declared fiscal emergency in California,
Governor Jerry Brown proposed to eliminate redevelopment in order
to funnel some of the redevelopment monies to special districts." As
a result, the California Legislature passed both AB 1X 26 and AB 1X
27 to help balance the state budget by rediverting funds back to local
governments-especially school districts.45 There were two different
components to AB 1X 26. The first component, called the "freeze,"
prevented RDAs from incurring new or expanding existing monetary
education and required the state to "set aside a designated portion of the General Fund
for public schools." Id. In 1990, Proposition 111 amended the Constitution by increasing
the minimum funding for public schools. Id. To meet the requirements of Proposition 98,
the state Legislature created the county educational revenue augmentation funds
("ERAF"), which is an "accounting device" to "reallocate property taxes to school
districts from other government entities." Id. The amount of property tax given to other
governmental entities was reduced and the difference was deposited into the ERAF. The
money in the ERAF was classified as part of the General Fund, and then distributed to
school districts. Id.
38. Detwiler, supra note 3, at 6.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 5.
41. See id. at 6.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 7; Cal. Redev. Ass'n v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th 231, 241 (2011).
45. Id. at 250.
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or legal obligations." This restricted the powers of RDAs, and
prohibited RDAs from issuing and selling bonds, incurring debt,
accepting loans, giving refunds, restructuring or refinancing
indebtedness or obligations, and creating new redevelopment
agencies. 47 The freeze component however, did not eliminate any
previous enforceable obligations." In fact, AB 1X 26 required all
successor agencies to continue making all "scheduled payments for
enforceable obligations." 49 The purpose of the Act's freeze provision
was to "preserve, to the maximum extent possible, the revenues and
assets of redevelopment agencies so that those assets and revenues
that [were] not needed to pay for enforceable obligations [could] be
used by local governments to fund core governmental services" such
as schools.0 The second component, known as the "dissolution"
component, eliminates RDAs within the state." Control of the assets
would transfer to successor agencies, such as the cities or counties
that created the RDAs.52 The successor agencies would then be
tasked with making payments and meeting existing obligations under
previous RDA agreements.53
On the other hand, AB 1X 27 was an escape hatch that allowed
RDAs to continue to exist as long as they were able to meet certain
requirements.54 Specifically, RDAs would not dissolve as long as the
city or county with an RDA agreed to make payments that would go
to both the "county ERAF and a new county special district
augmentation fund on behalf of the redevelopment agencies."5  This
would then benefit the state's schools and special districts." If the city
or county elected to make the payments, it had to adopt a resolution
46. Id.
47. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 34162(a), 34166 (2011).
48. Id. § 34169.
49. Id. § 34169(a).
50. Id. § 34167(a).
51. Id. § 34172.
52. Cal. Redev. Ass'n v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th 231, 251 (2011).
53. Id.
54. See Paul Esformes & Zane Gresham, Redevelopment Agencies: Dead, But Not
Buried, MORRISON FOERSTER CLIENT ALERT, Jan. 4, 2012, at 1, available at http://www.
mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/120104-Redevelopment-Agencies.pdf (classifying AB 1X
27 as the "alternative survival scheme" to AB 1X 26).
55. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th at 251; see also supra note 37.
56. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th at 241.
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of intent. The RDA would not dissolve as long as it made timely
remittances."
C. The California Supreme Court's Decision
The possible dissolution of RDAs was especially troublesome for
cities because "redevelopment had become so deeply embedded in
the structure of every municipality in the state" and served as the only
way for cities to "capture a greater portion of property tax revenue."
As a result, in California Redevelopment Association v. Matosantos,
the California Redevelopment Association and the League of
California Cities sued California's Director of Finance, Ana
Matosantos.m The suit challenged the constitutionality of both AB
1X 26 and AB 1X 27, specifically alleging that that the legislation was
invalid because it violated Proposition 22 (codified under Article
XIII, section 25.5(a)(7) of the California Constitution), which limited
the state's ability to collect payments from RDAs.61 The California
Supreme Court held AB 1X 27 was unconstitutional because it
violated Proposition 22.62 It violated Proposition 22 because AB 1X
27 required cities to make payments that would benefit the state and
because it would replace funding that the state otherwise would have
to provide under Proposition 98.63 Thus, the Legislature's only
alternative to dissolution was eliminated.
AB 1X 26, however, was held constitutional, effectively allowing
the end of RDAs in California.' The basis for the court's decision
was the notion that "[w]hat the Legislature has enacted, it may
repeal."6  Therefore, it was well within the Legislature's ability to
eliminate RDAs. The "freeze" component of AB 1X 26 was also
57. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34193(b) (2011), invalidated by Matosantos, 53
Cal. 4th 231 (2011).
58. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34193(a) (2011), invalidated by Matosantos, 53
Cal. 4th 231 (2011).
59. Josh Stephens & William Fulton, A Quickie Divorce: Local Government and
Redevelopment Agencies in California, 64 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. No. 6,2012, at 9.
60. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th at 242 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
25.5(a)(7) (prohibiting the Legislature from enacting a statute that would require an RDA
"to pay, remit, loan, or otherwise transfer, directly or indirectly, taxes on ad valorem real
property and tangible personal property pursuant to Section 16 of Article XVI to or for
the benefit of the state, any agency of the state, or any jurisdiction")).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 264.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 265.
65. Id. at 255.
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held constitutional& Since the Legislature has the power to
terminate RDAs, it follows that the Legislature would have the
"ability to decide when redevelopment agencies could cease to
exist ... or at what point, as part of winding up and dissolving, they
would be relieved of the ability to make new binding commitments
and engage in new business." 7 It would not be reasonable to expect
an existing entity to "dissolve instantaneously."" Therefore, the
California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of AB 1X 26,
resulting in the dissolution of RDAs effective February 1, 2012.
III. Redevelopment Agencies Post-Matosantos
While the California Supreme Court's decision in Matosantos
was a death sentence to redevelopment in California, the decision did
not end the story for redevelopment. In fact, it marked the beginning
of a fight by cities to restore some remnants of redevelopment. The
state could not have anticipated the problems that would erupt as a
result of upholding AB 1X 26 and striking down AB 1X 27. In
addition, AB 1484, the cleanup bill enacted to further enforce AB 1X
26, has been met with opposition and litigation.o
A. Enforcing AB IX 26: Winding Down Redevelopment and Managing
Existing Obligations
One of AB 1X 26's main goals was to wind down
redevelopment-mainly by paying off existing obligations." After the
court's holding in Matosantos, however, AB 1X 26 created more
questions than answers. Most notably, what would happen to the
RDAs' existing obligations and assets? Which "enforceable
obligations" would be recognized as part of the winding down
process? 72 Moreover, no information was given as to how assets
should be disposed of,73 and AB 1X 26 did not address how to handle
66. Id. at 264.
67. Id. at 263.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 265.
70. League of California Cities Reacts to AB 1484, the Redevelopment Budget Trailer
Bill, LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, June 27, 2012, available at https://www.cacities.org/
Top/News/News-Articles/2012/June/League-of-California-Cities-Reacts-to-AB-1484,-the.
71. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34175(a) (2014).
72. See Esformes & Gresham, supra note 54, at 2.
73. Ursula Hyman et al., California Supreme Court Eliminates Redevelopment
Agencies, MONDAQ (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/162514/
Environmental+Law/California+Supreme+Court+Eliminates+Redevelopment+Agencies.
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contracts that are in the midst of performance.4 Because a number of
redevelopment projects were in the middle of performance, the end
of RDAs would mean that many projects would terminate mid-
performance, thus impairing contractual obligations. Moreover,
although some of the projects were contracted prior to the RDAs'
dissolution, the actual performance in certain cases does not take
place until after the dissolution." How should these obligations be
treated? Contracts with bondholders were also under the threat of
impairment. In all, the dissolution of RDAs did not "produce a
clean break," but rather "creat[ed] problems about as fast as it
created cash for the state."78
Once RDAs were dissolved under AB 1X 26, successor agencies,
such as the city or county that created the RDA, were tasked with
honoring obligations incurred by the existing RDAs.79  These
successor agencies-vested with all the authority, rights, powers, and
duties once belonging to former RDAs-were under the authority of
a seven-member oversight board that would "approve and direct
certain actions of the successor agency."" Assets of the former RDAs
were transferred to the new successor agencies." The former TIF
funds were characterized as property tax revenues, and deposited into
a Redevelopment Property Tax Trust Fund ("RPTTF"), which was
administered by each of the counties' Auditor-Controllers." The
funds in the RPTTF are administered for the "benefit of the holders
of former redevelopment agency enforceable obligations and the
taxing entities that receive pass-through payments and distributions
of property taxes.""
One of the first responsibilities of the successor agencies was to
continue making payments that were due under the RDAs'
"enforceable obligations."" Under AB 1X 26, enforceable
74. See Stephens & Fulton, supra note 59, at 9.
75. Hyman et al., supra note 73.
76. Id.
77. See Stephens & Fulton, supra note 59, at 9 (discussing the issue of whether prior
development activities would continue post Matosantos).
78. Hamilton, supra note 11.
79. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 34169, 34177 (2014).
80. Hyman et al., supra note 73.
81. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34175(b) (2014).
82. Id. § 34182(c)(2).
83. Id.
84. Id. § 34177(a).
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obligations generally included bonds, loans of money borrowed by an
RDA, payments and preexisting obligations required by federal
government or state law, judgments or settlements entered against a
former RDA, any legally binding and enforceable agreement or
contract not otherwise void, contracts or agreements necessary for the
administration or operation of a successor agency, and amounts
borrowed from or payments owed to an RDA's Low and Moderate
Income Housing fund.5 Despite this statutory prescription, confusion
still exists as to whether certain existing projects and obligations
started by the former RDAs qualify as "enforceable obligations"
under AB 1X 26.8 Specifically, the successor agencies and the
Department of Finance were at odds as to what obligations should be
honored: Successor agencies wanted to honor all existing contracts so
that all existing or pending projects could be completed, whereas the
Department of Finance wanted to "accelerat[e] dissolution to free up
tax increment funds for other purposes.""
The California Department of Finance tried to further clarify this
requirement by stating that "[p]lans, statements of intent, statements
of intent to award, designations of project areas, descriptions or lists
of projects, or commitments by the agency without any counter
party.. . will not be considered enforceable obligations."'
Additionally, contracts that are vague, intended to develop future
proposals or contracts, or "a contract to design something" are not
contracts.89  Conversely, enforceable obligations include "written
contracts for specific performance with parties that are not the
sponsoring agency."'
To fulfill its responsibilities of honoring existing obligations,
successor agencies were required to prepare a Recognized Obligation
Payment Schedule ("ROPS"), which listed all of the enforceable
obligations owed by the RDA and the sources for paying the
85. Id. § 34171(d)(1)(A)-(G).
86. See Hyman et al., supra note 73.
87. Seth Merewitz & Ethan J. Walsh, Redevelopment After RDAs: The demise of
California's redevelopment agencies obliges local governments and developers to explore
new financing methods, 35 L.A. LAWYER No. 11, Feb. 2013, at 24,28.
88. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY
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enforceable obligations.91 Only those enforceable obligations listed
and approved on the ROPS may be paid by funds from the RPTTF.'
After the ROPS are prepared by the successor agencies, they are
submitted to the oversight board for approval.3 After the oversight
board reviews the ROPS, it sends the ROPS to the Department of
Finance for approval. 94 If the Department of Finance chooses to
review the ROPS, it has forty-five days to review and make a final
determination on the ROPS.5 Thus, even though the successor
agencies have the power to list projects that would require payment
on the ROPS, the ROPS is still subject to the approval of the
oversight board, the Department of Finance, and the County
Auditor-Controller." Any of these administrative bodies can object
to items they deem an unenforceable obligation and remove those
items from the ROPS." If the successor agency disputes the
Department of Finance's determination, the parties can convene a
"meet and confer," which includes an informal meeting between the
successor agency and the Department of Finance, and culminates in a
final determination by the Department of Finance.98
Once the Department of Finance approves the ROPS and any
disputes are resolved, the County Auditor-Controller allocates and
remits monies from the RPTTF to the successor agencies every six
months." The money that the successor agency receives should be
used for payments listed on the ROPS, in the following order of
priority:
1. Debt service payments scheduled to be made for
tax allocation bonds.
2. Payments scheduled to be made on revenue bonds,
but only to the extent the revenues pledged for
them are insufficient to make the payments and
91. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34177(a)(1) (2014).
92. Id. § 34177(a)(3).
93. Id. §§ 34177(l)(2)(B), 34180(g).
94. Id. § 34179(h).
95. Id. § 34177(m).
96. Id. §§ 34177(m), 34179(h), 34182.5.
97. Id. §§ 34177(m), 34179(h), 34182.5.
98. Id. § 34177(m).
99. Id. § 34183(a).
970 [Vol. 41:4
only if the agency's tax increment revenues were
also pledged for the repayment of the bonds.
3. Payments scheduled for other debts ind
obligations listed in the [ROPS] that are required
to be paid from former tax increment revenue.xoo
After the county auditor-controller has made the appropriate
allocations to the successor agencies to pay their enforceable
obligations, pass-through payments, and other administrative costs,
the remaining funds in the RPTTF go to the taxing entities.'o
B. Enacting AB 1484: The True-Up Payment Scheme and Due
Diligence Review
On June 27, 2012, the California Legislature passed AB 1484 as a
budget trailer bill'" to assist with the enforcement of AB 1X 26.
When the Matosantos case was pending before the California
Supreme Court, the Court stayed the implementation of AB 1X 26
for four months.103 Because of the stay, the state was concerned that
the taxing agencies did not receive the full funds they were entitled to
from the RPTTF during the 2011-2012 fiscal year.'" The "true-up"
provision in AB 1484 was enacted to ensure that property tax
revenues were properly distributed to the taxing agencies for the
2011-2012 fiscal year by recapturing payments that should have been
100. Id. § 34183(a)(2). In addition to funds remitted to pay enforceable obligations
listed on the ROPS, the auditor-controller also remits funds to local agencies and school
entities based on pass-through payment obligations, and administrative costs set forth in
the administrative budget. Any remaining monies would go to local agencies and school
entities pursuant to California Health and Safety Code § 34188. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 34183(a)(1), (3), (4) (2012).
101. Id. § 34183(a)(4).
102. Budget trailer bills are budget implementation bills passed alongside the Budget
Bill to facilitate the changes that may take place in light of the newly passed Budget Bill.
These budget trailer bills are heard and passed concurrently with the Budget Bill.
California's Budget Process, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE (Sept. 2012),
available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/fisa/bag/process.htm. As a budget trailer bill, AB 1484
took effect immediately when it was signed. It did not attain the two-thirds vote in each
chamber of the Legislature. William Dotinga, Cities Fight California's Giant Money Grab,
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (Oct. 12, 2012, 10:05 AM), http://www.courthousenews.
com/2012/10/12/51224.htm.
103. Cal. Redev. Ass'n v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th 231, 274 (2011).
104. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34183.5 (2012) (acknowledging that the
delayed implementation of AB 1X 26 due to Matosantos decision may have caused
"disruption" to distribution of payments to taxing entities).
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made to taxing entities during the 2011-2012 fiscal year but for the
court staying AB 1X 26's implementation.'5 AB 1484 outlined new
procedures governing the transfer of properties to successor agencies
by introdicing the true-up payment scheme and the submission of
Due Diligence Reports ("DDR")."0
1. True- Up Payments
Under the true-up provision of AB 1484, the County Auditor-
Controller determined whether the successor agency owed any true-
up payments to the taxing agencies according to what was listed on
the ROPS." A successor agency owed payment under AB 1484 if the
taxing agency did not receive the full funds during the 2011-2012
fiscal year." If the successor agency owed a payment, the County
Auditor-Controller sent a demand for payment to the successor
agency requesting payment no later than July 12, 2012.'" Then, the
County Auditor-Controller made the required payments to the
appropriate taxing entities no later than July 16, 2012.10 Any
successor agency that failed to remit payment by the deadline would
be subject to the following penalties:
1. The successor agency cannot pay any other
obligations other than bond debt until payment is
remitted to the county auditor-controller;"'
2. The city or county that created the RDA would
not receive the "distribution of sales and use tax"
or any payment "up to the amount owed to taxing
entities, until the payment" is made;112
3. The successor agency and the city or county that
created the RDA would be subject to a civil
penalty in the amount equal to ten percent of
amount owed to taxing entities plus an additional
105. See id. § 34183.5(b).
106. Id. §§ 34183.5(b), 34179.5, 34179.6.
107. Id. § 34183.5.
108. Id. § 34183.5(a).
109. Id. § 34183.5(b)(2).
110. Id.
111. Id. § 34183.5(b)(2)(C).
112. Id.
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1.5 percent per month for each month the payment
is late;"3 and
4. The county auditor-controllers would deduct from
future distributions of property taxes from the
RPTTF the amount by which the successor agency
owes. These funds from the RPTLTF would
otherwise be used to pay enforceable obligations.H4
2. Due Diligence Review
AB 1484 also imposed on successor agencies the responsibility of
conducting a Due Diligence Review ("DDR")-a more rigorous
approach than the ROPS-meant "to determine the unobligated
balances available for transfer to taxing entities.""' Essentially, the
DDR requirement exists to determine the amount of cash assets a
former RDA possesses (that are not tied to enforceable obligations)
so that these funds can be distributed to the taxing entities."' AB
1484 required a "licensed accountant, approved by the county
auditor-controller ... with experience and expertise in local
government account" to perform the reviews." The first DDR was
made for the Low and Moderate Income Housing fund due October
15, 2012, and the second was for all other funds due January 15,
2013.n1 Once the amount of cash (and cash equivalent) available to
the taxing entities is determined, the reports are then submitted to the
oversight board, the county auditor-controller, the state controller,
and the Department of Finance for review."9 The administrative
bodies can make any adjustments to the amounts based on their own
findings.20 While the Department of Finance must meet and confer
with the successor agency regarding any disputes to the adjustments
made, ultimately, the Department of Finance makes the final
113. Id.
114. Id. § 34183.5(b)(3).
115. Id. § 34179.5.
116. Aftermath of the Dissolution of Redevelopment Agencies in California-What
Happens Next? (85th Annual Meeting), STATE BAR OF CALIF. (Oct. 13, 2012), available
at http://html.documation.com/cds/SBC2012/Support/PDFs/088.pdf; CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 34179.5 (2012).
117. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34179.5(a) (2012).
118. Id. § 34179.5(c)(5).
119. Id. § 34179.6.
120. Id. § 34179.6(d).
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determination as to the amounts of funds owed.'21 After the
Department of Finance determines how much money the successor
agency is to remit to the county auditor-controller for distribution to
other taxing entities, the successor agency receives notice of the
amount owed and must make payment by the statutorily imposed
deadlines.122 Once the payment is made, the Department of Finance
awards the successor agency a "Finding of Completion."'" If the
successor agency fails to make a payment, it is subject to a set of
penalties, including:
1. The Department of Finance may order an offset to
the distribution of sales and use tax revenue equal
to the amount that is owed;124
2. The county auditor-controller may reduce the
property tax allocations to the city or county;'" and
3. The Department of Finance can "direct the county
auditor-controller to deduct the unpaid amount
from future allocations of property tax to the
successor agency" until the payment is made.'26
Thus, changes to the redevelopment dissolution process would
introduce new requirements with potentially dangerous penalties to
both the cities and counties should the successor agency fail to comply
with the new provisions.
IV. Recent Legal Disputes"
Despite the California Supreme Court's determination that AB
1X 26 is constitutional, lawsuits have erupted in recent years
challenging the constitutionality of AB 1X 26, as well as AB 1484. In
121. Id. § 34179.6(e).
122. Id. § 34179.6(d)-(f).
123. Id. § 34179.7
124. Id. § 34179.6(h)(1)(C).
125. Id.
126. Id. § 34179.6(h)(2).
127. Given that 150 lawsuits have been filed on numerous grounds, this Note
addresses only the main constitutional arguments. The list of constitutional arguments
and legal disputes in this section is not meant to be exhaustive. A list of all
redevelopment-related lawsuits is available at http://www.cacities.orgfUploadedFiles/
Leaguelnternet/7d/7dlle9fe-c72e-47c8-81c3-ea5390299e4e.pdf.
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fact, over 150 lawsuits (and counting) have been brought by cities,
successor agencies, and special districts against the State of
California, California's Department of Finance and public officials
associated with finance and redevelopment, such as Governor Jerry
Brown, Department of Finance Director Ana J. Matosantos (now
Michael Cohen), Controller John Chiang, and various county auditor-
controllers.'" Each lawsuit is at different stages of litigation.129 A
majority of the lawsuits allege infringements of both the state and
federal constitutions.o
The constitutional claims regarding redevelopment allege that
the application of AB 1X 26 and AB 1484 violate either the state or
federal constitution.' A selection of the main constitutional
arguments is examined below.
A. AB 1X 26: Impairment of Contracts for Reduced Bond Rating
Violating Article XVI of the California Constitution
AB 1X 26's passage resulted in a decrease in bond value of the
loans used to fund the many redevelopment projects. 32 At least two
lawsuits have been filed on the grounds that this lowering of the bond
value is an impairment of the Contracts Clause in the U.S.
Constitution."' The plaintiffs in City of Cerritos v. State were the first
to raise an impairment of contracts argument." The plaintiffs argued
that AB 1X 26 "unconstitutionally impairs, negates, diminishes,
denigrates, and abrogates numerous agreements, covenants, and
legally enforceable commitments between and among redevelopment
agencies, cities, counties, and private third parties, including
bondholders and private corporations. . . .""' In Syncora Guarantee
Inc. v. State, bond insurer Syncora brought suit against the State of
128. Jim Miller, Redevelopment-One year after dissolution, litigation and dissension,
THE PRESS ENTERPRISE (Feb. 11, 2013, 7:47 A.M.), http://www.pe.com/local-news/politics
/jim-miller-headlines/20130211-redevelopment-one-year-after-dissolution-litigation-and-di
ssension.ece. See also League of California Cities Summary, supra note 10.
129. See League of California Cities Summary, supra note 10.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Michael J. Kiely & Phillip M. Tate, Redevelopment: Rising From The Ashes Or
Final Death Rattle?, MARTINDALE.COM (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.martindale.com/
government-law/articleSheppard-Mullin-Richter-Hampton-LLP_1598768.htm.
133. See id.
134. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for Writ of
Mandate at 3, City of Cerritos v. State, No. 34-2011-80000952 (Cal. Super. Sept. 26, 2011).
135. Id. at 7.
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California challenging the constitutionality of AB 1X 26 based on
violations of both the federal and California constitutions. 6
Specifically, Syncora argued that AB 1X 26 is unconstitutional
because RDAs' dissolution would impair existing contracts, thereby
violating the Contracts Clause. On May 29, 2013, the Syncora
action was dismissed on the grounds that the claims were premature
because there was no evidence that any of the insured bonds were in
default or that defaults would "inevitably ... occur."'38
Historically, RDAs raised funds for redevelopment projects by
issuing bonds, which were constitutionally secured and backed by tax
increment financing.139 Section 16 of Article XVI of the California
Constitution provides that the:
[Plortion of the levied taxes each year in excess of that
amount shall be allocated to and when collected shall
be paid into a special fund of the redevelopment
agency to pay the principal of and interest on loans,
moneys advanced to, or indebtedness . . . incurred by
the redevelopment agency to finance or refinance, in
whole or in part, the redevelopment project."
Furthermore, the California Constitution provides that tax
incremental financing "may be irrevocably pledged for the payment
of the principal and interest on such loans, advances, or
indebtedness." 4 1 A pledged collateral by an RDA to "secure ... the
payment of the principal or redemption price of, or interest on, any
bonds, or any reimbursement agreement with any provider of credit
to bonds ... issued by or entered into by an agency shall be valid and
binding in accordance with the terms of the pledge document .... 142
The pledge constitutes a lien and security interest, which would
be "enforceable against the pledgor, its successors, purchasers of
136. See Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandate at 1-3, Syncora Guarantee Inc.
v. State, No. 34-2012-80001215 (Cal. Super. Aug. 1, 2012), 2012 WL 3317082.
137. Id. at 3.
138. Ruling on Submitted Matter: Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 8, Syncora Guarantee Inc. v. State, No. 34-2012-
80001215 (Cal. Super. May 29, 2013), 2012 WL 3317082.
139. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 33640,33641.5 (2014).
140. Id. § 33670(b). Section 33670 "fulfills the intent of Section 16 of Article XVI of
the [California] Constitution." Id. § 33670.5.
141. Id. § 33671.
142. Id. § 33641.5(b).
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collateral, creditors, and all others . . . .14 By pledging that tax
increment funding would be used for redevelopment projects, it
"increase[ed] the likely availability of increasing property tax
increment streams to pay such bonds."'" People bought the bonds
materially relying on this constitutional protection that the bonds
would be secured by tax incremental financing. 145 Thus, to raise funds
for redevelopment projects, the RDA would enter into contracts with
bondholders and bond insurers where tax increment revenue was
pledged to secure the bonds.'" For example, the bond insurer
Syncora would enter into a contract with Hespira RDA, stating that
the bonds would be secured by a "pledge of and lien on all of the Tax
Revenues." 47
AB 1X 26 eliminated this security provision of these contracts by
transforming all of the tax increment revenue into general property
tax revenue.'" Funds from the general property tax revenue would be
distributed amongst other taxing entities and, therefore, lack the
secure and consistent funding stream that the tax increment
provided.4 9 Moreover, all remaining debt from the former RDA was
transferred to the successor agencies even though the former RDAs
were listed as the principal on each of the bond contracts.o Because
of these new changes and the uncertainty with the new funding
stream, plaintiffs alleged that AB1X26 violated the contracts clause of
the Constitution because an important security provision within the
contracts-tax increment revenues-was eliminated."' Since the
payment for the bonds was changed from a secured payment source
to an unsecured payment source, the value of the bond decreased, as
evaluated by Moody Investor Services.'52 California tax allocation
bonds that were rated Baa3 or higher were downgraded to a rating of
143. Id.
144. Kiely & Tate, supra note 132; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33671.5
(providing that irrevocable pledge "shall have priority over any other claim").
145. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs'lPetitioners'
Complaint and Writ of Mandate at 5, Syncora Guarantee Inc. v. State, No. 34-2012-
80001215 (Cal. Super. Mar. 19, 2013), 2012 WL 3317082.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 6.
148. Kiely & Tate, supra note 132.
149. Id.
150. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs'[Petitioners'
Complaint and Writ of Mandate, supra note 145, at 1-2.
151. Kiely & Tate, supra note 132.
152. Id.
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Bal: junk bond status.153 Central to Moody's determination in
reducing the status of the bonds was the "increased uncertainty over
timely debt repayments" because of the dissolution of RDAs.14 The
reduction of the bond status is especially problematic because
California is the "country's biggest issuer of municipal debt.""' Thus,
AB 1X 26 changed the repayment source for the bonds by making it
more susceptible to shortfall, which impaired the bondholders'
contractual rights."'
B. AB 1X 26: Failing to Recognize Enforceable Obligations as an
Impairment of Contracts
Despite AB 1X 26's flaws, cities have tried to comply with its
requirements. Under AB 1X 26, the county auditor-controller will
only allocate funds for those items listed on the approved ROPS,
subject to the authority of the county auditor-general, the oversight
board, and the Department of Finance."' While section 34171(1)(a)
of the California Health and Safety Code lists the different types of
enforceable obligations, there has not been any agreement as to
which projects would qualify as an enforceable obligations."' As of
May 2012, the Department of Finance questioned whether $350
million worth in projects were in fact enforceable obligations."' Many
projects deemed by the city as an enforceable obligation were struck
down by the Department of Finance-meaning that cities would be
forced to "abandon projects that have been promised to citizens and
bondholders and that are key to revitalizing recession-battered
neighborhoods."" Most importantly, the cities would inevitably be
breaking a contract with the private party if they cannot secure funds
to pay the private parties to complete the project. Additionally, the
153. Hamilton, supra note 11. Baa3 is a bond credit rating classifying bonds that are
subject to moderate credit risk. Bonds with a Bal rating are subject to substantial credit
risk. Financial Glossary, NASDAQ (2011), http://www.nasdaq.comlinvesting/glossary/b/
baa3, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/b/bal.
154. Kiely & Tate, supra note 132.
155. Hamilton, supra note 11.
156. Geoffrey K. Willis, Redevelopment Law Unconstitutional Because of Impairment
of Contract?, MARTINDALE.COM (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.martindale.com/litigation-
law/article-Sheppard-Mullin-Richter-Hampton-LLP1472714.htm.
157. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34171(d)(1) (2012).
158. See Hyman et al., supra note 73.
159. Jessica Garrison, Cities to Battle California in Court for Redevelopment Money,
L.A. TIMES (May 30, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/30/local/la-me-redevelop
ment-fight-20120530.
160. Id.
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Department of Finance's actions have caused a rift between cities and
the state, and angered many city officials who characterize the
rejection by the Department of Finance as "unjust.""' Many city
officials question the state's decision to reject some of the projects,
claiming that the state only wants to "shut these projects down so
they can take the money.',162
Successor agencies' only recourse if they wish to appeal the
Department of Finance's decision to reject certain enforceable
obligations is a "meet-and-confer" with the Department. 163 However,
the meet-and-confers have not been fruitful, and as a result, many
successor agencies, as well as private third parties, have filed lawsuits
against the state challenging the state's rejection of redevelopment
projects that should be included as enforceable obligations.'" For
example, the City of Irvine filed suit against the Department of
Finance because the Department denied payment for the
construction of a park on the former site of the El Toro Marine Corps
Air Station.16' The city entered into an agreement with a private
third-party entity to construct the park in 2010.'" The project was to
be funded through tax increment, and not through the city's general
fund.'67 It was approved by the oversight board, but rejected by the
Department of Finance.'" Thus, Irvine sued the Department of
Finance in order to receive funds to pay for the project.6  Without
the funds, Irvine was unable to pay for the project.' In another suit,
the City of Bakersfield alleged that the Department of Finance
erroneously ruled that $4.2 million in outstanding obligations for two
senior housing projects were not enforceable, despite their approval
in September 2010.171 These examples are only a small sample of the
161. Miller, supra note 128.
162. Garrison, supra note 159 (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34177(m) (2014).
164. Miller, supra note 128.
165. Petition for Writ of Mandates and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief at 1, City of Irvine v. Matosantos, Case No. 34-2012-80001161 (Cal. Super. May 25,
2012).
166. Id. at 9.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 13.
169. Id. at 16.
170. Id.
171. Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief at 26, City of Bakersfield v. Matosantos, Case No. 34-2013-80001400
(Cal. Super. Feb. 13, 2013).
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wide variety of different projects that are now being contested by
cities all over California.'72 The cities that initiated lawsuits regarding
enforceable obligations argue that the State's failure to provide funds
for these projects would violate the California and federal
Constitution by failing to honor existing contracts and obligations.17'
C. AB 1484: Unconstitutionality of the True-Up Payment Plan and
Due Diligence Review Penalty Provisions 74
AB 1484's enactment has been just as controversial as the
passage of AB 1X 26. Particularly problematic are the penalties that
AB 1484 imposes on cities and counties. A central claim of lawsuits
challenging AB 1484 is that the authority granted to the "Department
of Finance to take tax revenues as penalties . . . goes too far." 71
Although AB 1484 was enacted to create more funds for the state
budget, practically speaking, AB 1484 also puts "property and sales
tax revenues of cities at risk at a time of great fiscal uncertainty"
because these threatened funds may otherwise be used to provide
"vital public safety and other city services" to city residents.1' To
overturn certain aspects of AB 1484, plaintiffs such as cities and
successor agencies have disputed the constitutionality of the act based
on the infringement of certain provisions of the California
Constitution, specifically sections 24(b) and 25.5 of Article XIII of the
California Constitution, which were added as a result of the passage
of Proposition 1A and Proposition 22."
172. Other examples include loans that needed to be repaid, payments for affordable
housing units, costs for bridge projects, etc. See, e.g., Update on Recent Decisions Relating
to the Dissolution of Redevelopment Agencies in California (April 2014), GIBsON DUNN,
(Apr. 16, 2014), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Update-
on-Recent-Court-Decisions-Relating-to-Dissolution-of-Redevelopment-Agencies-in-Calif
ornia-April2014.pdf (summary of recently decided lawsuits concerning redevelopment).
173. See, e.g., Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint, supra note 171, at 32.
174. Lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the AB 1484 True-Up Payment Plan
have also challenged the method of calculation for the true-up payments. See Aftermath
of the Dissolution of Redevelopment Agencies in California, supra note 116. This will not
be addressed in this Note.
175. Loretta Kalb, CA Cities Fight Transfer of Assets, SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 1,
2012), reprinted in MUNICIPAL INSIDER, available at http://www.municipalinsider.com/ca-
cities-fight-transfer-of-assets
176. Press Release, League of California Cities, League of California Cities
Challenges Constitutionality of Portions of AB 1484, the Redevelopment Budget Trailer
Law (Sept. 24, 2012), available at http://www.cacities.org/UploadedFiles/Leaguelnternet/
a8/a86d3532-fb2d-4789-aded-97e00d1c332f.pdf.
177. See, e.g., Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, at 7,
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Plaintiffs' main argument on the unconstitutionality of AB 1484
concerns the penalties imposed by the True-Up Payment Plan and
DDR provisions.7 AB 1484 requires the county auditors to
determine whether or not the successor agencies owe any true-up
payments or DDR payments. If the successor agencies fail to make
the payments within the required timeframe, they are then subject to
penalties, which include the withholding of sales and use tax until
payment is made, and the deduction of property taxes from the
RPTITF.179
Plaintiffs allege that withholding sales and use tax from cities
violates section 24 of Article XIII of the California Constitution,
which provides that the "Legislature may not reallocate, transfer,
borrow, appropriate, restrict the use of, or otherwise use the proceeds
of any tax imposed or levied by a local government solely for the local
government's purposes."" In addition, the state is not allowed to
change the method of distributing revenues under the Bradley-Burns
Uniform Sales and Use Law."' By withholding sales and use taxes,
AB 1484 essentially violates the aforementioned constitutional
provisions by reallocating, using, and changing the "method of
distributing local sales tax revenue."182
Generally, the state Board of Equalization collects the local sales
and use tax and remits the payment to each city or county under the
Bradley-Burns Uniform Sales and Use Tax Law ("Bradley-Burns")
(codified under sections 7200-7226 of the California Revenue & Tax
Code).83 The city or county can then use the sales and use tax
revenue for their own intended purpose.'4 By withholding general
sales and use tax from cities and counties, penalties under both the
True-Up Payment Plan and the DDR strip funds from cities' and
League of California Cities v. Matosantos, No. 34-80001275 (Cal. Super. Feb. 1, 2013);
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for Writ of Mandate, City of
Bellflower v. Matosantos, No. 34-2012-80001269 (Cal. Super. Nov. 19, 2012), 2012 WL
4903340.
178. See id. at 8-12.
179. Id. §§ 34183.5(b)(2)(C), 34183.5(b)(3) ("any city, county or city and county that
created the redevelopment agency that fails to make the required payment . . . shall not
receive the distribution of sales and use tax").
180. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 24(b) (2010).
181. Id. § 25.5(a)(2)(A).
182. See id.
183. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 7202 (2012).
184. Id.
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counties' general purpose funds."' This contravenes the intended
purpose of Proposition 22-namely, to allow city councils to
determine how sales and use taxes should be used and to
"conclusively and completely prohibit state politicians in Sacramento
from seizing, diverting, shifting, borrowing, transferring, suspending,
or otherwise taking or interfering with revenues that are dedicated to
funding services provided by local government."'" AB 1484 punishes
cities and counties by taking away their sales and use tax revenue to
pay taxing entities, thereby stripping them of their power to
determine how to use their sales and use taxes.
Plaintiffs further allege that the penalties deducting property tax
revenues violate sections 25.5(a)(1)(A) and 25.5(a)(3) of Article XIII
of the California Constitution by reallocating and changing the
method of distributing property taxes.'" Section 25.5(a)(1)(A)
prohibits the legislature from altering the method in which "ad
valorem property tax revenues are allotted ... so as to reduce for any
fiscal year the percentage of the total amount of ad valorem property
tax revenues in a county that is allocated among all of the local
agencies ... for the same fiscal year."89 Section 25.5(a)(3) prohibits
the legislature from reallocating property taxes between cities,
counties, and special districts without a two-thirds vote by the state
legislature.' Given these provisions, plaintiffs allege that the
penalties related to property tax are an offset or reduction of
property tax that would reduce the city's pro rata share of property
taxes, as well as reallocate property taxes between cities, counties,
and special districts without a two-thirds vote by the legislature. 9' By
reducing the distribution of property taxes given to the cities and
transferring it to the taxing entities in order to pay debts owed by the
successor agency, it would effectively reduce the "pro rata share of
property taxes allocated to the city."'" This, plaintiffs contend, is a
direct violation of the California Constitution.193
185. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 34183.5(b)(2)(C), 34179(h)(1)(C) (2012).
186. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 24 Statement of Purpose.
187. Petitioner's Memorandum, supra note 177, at 9-10.
188. Id. at 8.
189. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 25.5(a)(1)(A) (2010).
190. Id. § 25.5(a)(3).
191. Petitioner's Memorandum, supra note 177, at 11.
192. Id. at 12.
193. Id. at 10.
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D. AB 1484: The California Department of Finance's Violation of the
California's Constitution's Legislative Non-Delegation Clause
In the same suits challenging the constitutionality of the True-Up
Payment Plan and the DDR requirement, another challenge raised
against AB 1484 is that the provisions promulgated by AB 1484
impermissibly delegate legislative power to an executive agency,
namely the Department of Finance."1 This is because several
provisions of AB 1484 grant the Department of Finance authority to
make substantial policy decisions within the Department's
"unfettered discretion."19' Specifically, AB 1484 allows the
Department of Finance to withhold sales and property tax from cities
and successor agencies and also to decide which obligations are
"enforceable obligations." "
Plaintiffs alleged that AB 1484 is arbitrary because it does not
include any "standards to govern application of many of its most
significant provisions," which have resulted in many different
interpretations." The main complaints regarding the delegation of
power to the Department of Finance include:
1. AB 1484 allows the Department of Finance to
''review all oversight board actions and reject or
accept the actions" without any clear standards or
criteria governing such determinations;"
2. AB 1484 does not impose any standards or criteria
for the Department of Finance in determining
which item on the ROPS should be rejected or
modified; "
3. AB 1484 allows the Department of Finance to
adjust the balance owed by the successor agencies
through the due diligence review process. There
194. Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Injunctive and
Declaratory Relief at 33, League of California Cities v. Matosantos, No. 34-2012-80001275
(Cal. Super. Sept. 24, 2012).
195. Id. at 32-34.
196. Id. at 33.
197. Id. at 32.
198. Id. at 33. See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34179(h) (2012).
199. Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate, supra note 194, at 33.
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are no standards governing whether or not an
adjustment should be made;200
4. AB 1484 does not set out any standards governing
how the Department of Finance can determine
whether the amount owed by the successor agency
is feasible; 01 and
5. AB 1484 does not provide any procedure or
administrative process where cities and successor
agencies could appeal the Department of Finance's
decision regarding true-up payments, or any other
payments or penalties. 2
Plaintiffs alleged that it is unconstitutional for the Legislature to
fail to provide "adequate direction for implementation of policies
adopted by the Legislature" and to give "absolute legislative
discretion" to an administrative body.203 Here, many of AB 1484's
provisions lack the standards necessary to guide the successor
agencies, oversight boards, and the Department of Finance in making
important decisions. 20 As a result, the Department of Finance
arguably has complete discretion in making such decisions affecting
successor agencies and cities.205
V. The Constitutional Problems Analyzed
A. Impairment of the United States Constitution's Contracts Clause
The U.S. Constitution's Contracts Clause provides that "[n]o
state shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts."2 0 In its seminal case, U.S.
Trust Co. v. New Jersey (U.S. Trust), the United States Supreme
Court found that for a law to be unconstitutional under the Contracts
200. Id. at 33-34. See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34179.5.
201. Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate, supra note 194, at 34. See also CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34179.6(h)(3) (2012).
202. Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate, supra note 194, at 34-35. See also CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34183.5(b) (2014).
203. Petitioner's Memorandum, supra note 177, at 13.
204. Id. at 14.
205. Id.
206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (2014).
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Clause, it must impair a contract in a manner that is constitutionally
impermissible.2' The purpose of the Contracts Clause was to limit
the "power of the states to modify their own contracts as well as to
regulate those between private parties."208 The Contracts Clause
helps to "encourage trade and credit by promoting confidence in the
stability of contractual obligations." 2" Specifically, U.S. Trust held
that a contractual impairment is unconstitutional when: (1) there is a
contractual obligation, (2) the legislation in question imposes an
impairment, and (3) the legislation does not reasonably and
210
necessarily serve an important public purpose.
B. AB 1X 26: Contractual Impairment of Bondholders
Even if courts find the matter of reduced rating of RDA bonds'
reduced rating ripe for adjudication, the plaintiffs likelihood of
prevailing remains unclear. Analyzed under the factors articulated in
U.S. Trust, it remains unclear whether the reduced bond rating could
constitute a contractual impairment.21
1. Is There a Contractual Obligation?
The "obligation of a contract is 'the law that binds the parties to
perform their agreement."'212 In cases contesting that a decrease in
bond value is an impairment of contract, the parties do not seem to
dispute that a contract was formed between the city, bondholders,
and the bond insurers. Here, in exchange for bonds from different
private parties, the RDAs have agreed to secure the bonds with tax
increment financing, thereby creating a contractual obligation.
2. Is There a Substantial Impairment?
A contract is impaired when a law "renders them invalid, or
releases or extinguishes them and impairment . .. has been predicated
of laws which without destroying contracts derogate from substantial
contractual rights."m' The impairment cannot be minimal.214 On the
other hand, a total destruction of a contractual obligation is not
207. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 20 (1977).
208. Id. at 17 (internal citation omitted).
209. Id. at 15 (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,427-28 (1934)).
210. Id. at 22-27.
211. See Kiely & Tate, supra note 132.
212. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 429.
213. Id. at 431.
214. Bd. of Admin. v. Wilson, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1109, 1153 (1997).
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required for a substantial impairment of a contract.215 The U.S.
Supreme Court reasoned that an elimination of an important security
provision could constitute an impairment of contract. 216 U.S. Trust is
instructive here. The situation at hand regarding redevelopment is
similar to U.S. Trust in that both cases revolve around municipal
217bonds where one of the parties is a public entity.
At issue in U.S. Trust was whether the State of New Jersey's
repeal of a 1962 covenant impaired the contractual obligations
between it and the bondholder."' In U.S. Trust, New York and New
Jersey entered into a covenant to allow the Port Authority to
"acquire, construct, and operate the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad
and the World Trade Center."21 9 The funds for the project came from
the sale of bonds to private investors.220 The two states and the
bondholders agreed that neither the states nor the Port Authority
would use revenues or reserves pledged as security for the bonds
except in certain limited circumstances. 22' The covenant was repealed
in 1973 because the states intended to limit the number of private
automobiles on the streets; the states felt that this interest was a
sufficient public purpose to justify repeal.222
Here, as in U.S. Trust, an important provision has been
eliminated, which impairs a contract. AB 1X 26 eliminated the tax
increment funds that were used to secure the bonds, which ultimately
altered the repayment obligation. 2 3 The State has argued that AB 1X
26 does not impair existing contracts at all-let alone impair them
substantially. 224 The basis for this argument is that AB 1X 26 honors
these existing obligations and protects both bondholders and
215. Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983)
(citing U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1977)).
216. U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 19.
217. Id. at 27.
218. Id. at 17.
219. Id. at 9.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 29.
223. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34182(c)(1) (2012) (amount of property
taxes that "would have been allocated to each redevelopment agency ... are deemed
property tax revenues").
224. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and/or Stay at 17, City of Cerritos v. State, No. 34-2011-80000952 (Cal. Super.
Jan. 17. 2012).
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creditors.225 For instance, AB 1X 26 requires that successor agencies
honor the enforceable obligations of the former RDAs, which
include, but are not limited to, paying off the RDAs' debts, disposing
of RDA assets "in a manner aimed at maximizing value," collecting
monies owed to the RDAs, and "oversee[ing] development of
properties until the contracted work has been completed or the
contractual obligations of the former redevelopment agency can be
transferred to other parties." 226 These enforceable obligations include
"bonds ... required debt service, reserve set-asides, and any other
payments required under the indenture or similar documents."227 The
successor agencies are still required to honor the bonds as an
enforceable obligation, which leaves the repayment guarantees
intact.2" Even though the tax increment funding was eliminated, the
bonds are still secured.
Although AB 1X 26 requires successor agencies to repay
bondholders, the contract is arguably still impaired. In U.S. Trust, for
example, the Supreme Court considered whether the covenant was
"modified or replaced by an arguably comparable security
provision." 229 The Court concluded that the state did not provide any
comparable security provision, so the repeal of the covenant was an
outright impairment of the obligation in the contract.230 In this case,
although the state argues that AB 1X 26 sufficiently secures the
bonds by requiring successor agencies to honor the previous
obligations, plaintiffs could reasonably argue that a bare repayment
obligation, absent a source of funding, is not a comparable security
provision. Under the tax increment financing scheme, bondholders
and bond insurers had greater assurance that the bond obligation
would be repaid because there was a reliable funding stream to
finance obligations incurred by the RDA.3' By eliminating this
reliable funding stream and failing to procure an alternative funding
source to secure the bonds, AB 1X 26 has reduced the degree to
which the state has secured its debt instruments.232
225. Id. at 17.
226. Id. at 17-18. See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 34177(a), (e), (f), (i) (2012).
227. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition, supra note 224, at 20.
228. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 34175(a), 34177(a).
229. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 (1977).
230. Id.
231. Marek v. Napa Cmty. Redev. Agency, 46 Cal. 3d 1070, 1083 (1988).
232. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support, supra note 145, at 15.
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The present obligations are now less secure for several reasons.
First, the obligations must now be paid from general property tax
revenues, which are disbursed among various taxing agencies."
Repaying bond obligations from general property tax revenues,
rather than from a designated funding source, makes repayment
contingent upon funding that may be constrained by allocation to
other agencies as well as other funding priorities. The bondholders
are put in the position of having to compete with other creditors. The
bondholders and bond insurers went from having the "senior-most
priority pledge of particular tax revenues[-]the tax increment[-to] a
claim for payment out of property taxes generally, with the same
priority as all other claimants against such property taxes."234
Essentially, the bondholders and bond insurers went from having the
most protection under the contract to a security provision with less
protection. The downgrade of the former RDA bonds is a good
indication that the new security provisions provided by AB 1X 26
were not comparable to the former security guarantee of tax
increment financing.
Additionally, plaintiffs could argue that the impairment was even
more substantial than the impairment at issue in U.S. Trust.235 In that
case, plaintiffs argued that the valuation of the Port Authority bonds
downgraded, but overall, the bonds still retained an "A" rating. *
While the Court in U.S. Trust never held the valuation as
determinative in the analysis, plaintiffs here could argue that the
impairment was more substantial than in U.S. Trust because here the
bonds were downgraded to "junk" status. Thus, the elimination of
the security provision, as in U.S. Trust, may be sufficient to qualify the
impairment as "substantial."
3. Reasonable and Necessary for Public Purpose?
Finding that the contract was substantially impaired is only the
beginning of the inquiry. Even if the contract is substantially
impaired, the state acts unconstitutionally only if the impairment not
233. Kiely & Tate, supra note 132.
234. Id.
235. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support, supra note 145, at 15-16
("[AB IX 26] works a greater impairment of contract than in U.S. Trust, for it eliminates
all future security on the bonded indebtedness and further requires that security already
accrued in RDA reserves be redistributed to local agencies .. . whereas in US. Trust, the
States' repeal of the covenant merely threatened future depletion of bondholder security
by uneconomical investment.").
236. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 (1977).
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"reasonable and necessary" to serve an important public purpose.
Arguably, AB 1X 26 is constitutional because the legislation was
reasonable and necessary to serve the public purpose of funding
important taxing entities during a fiscal emergency. When evaluating
whether the impairment is reasonable and necessary, the Supreme
Court does not completely defer to legislative intent because it
recognizes that the state itself has an interest in the legislation as a
commercial actor.2m Complete deference to the legislature would
render the Contracts Clause meaningless because a governmental
entity "can always find a use for extra money" to justify an
impairment based on a need to provide for a public purpose.2 9 In
US. Trust, the Supreme Court recognized public transportation,
energy conservation, and environmental protection as legitimate
public purposes; nevertheless, the Supreme Court found it
inappropriate for the Legislature to ignore the "private welfare of its
creditors."240
As stated above, AB lX 26 was passed in response to
California's 2011 fiscal crisis. Important taxing entities, including
school districts and other public services, were not receiving enough
funds to provide for important social services because of the tax
incremental financing. The Supreme Court has recognized,
however, that an economic emergency may be sufficient to justify
impairing a contract.2
In Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, the Supreme
Court upheld a Minnesota statute that postponed execution sales and
extended the time to redeem mortgages from foreclosures.243 The
statute was enacted during the Great Depression when there were an
increasing number of home foreclosures.24 The statute was upheld
based on four different factors considered by the Supreme Court: (1)
Minnesota was undergoing an economic emergency (the Great
Depression), which is a "potent cause" that justified the use of state
power to provide for the community interests; (2) the legislation was
used for a legitimate end and not for the advantage of particular
237. Id. at 22.
238. Id. at 25-26.
239. Id. at 26.
240. Id. at 29.
241. Detwiler, supra note 3, at 6.
242. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 415 (1934).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 419.
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individuals; (3) the relief sought was appropriate to that emergency
and were reasonable; and (4) the legislation was temporary and
limited to the exigent circumstances.2 45  These factors have been
recognized and used by both the California Supreme Court and the
U.S. Supreme Court.2" However, since Blaisdell, the Court has held
that these factors may be considered, but are not dispositive.
Several California court cases have found a fiscal emergency
insufficient to justify an impairment of contract. In Valdes v. Cory,
the California Supreme Court held that a statute that suspended
funding for public employees' retirement plans constituted an
impairment of contract because, despite a fiscal emergency,
alternative means were not considered, and there was no indication
that the emergency was only temporary.2" Additionally, in Board of
Administration v. Wilson, budget cuts in health, education and
welfare programs, as well as hiring freezes, were held to be
insufficient justifications to support an impairment of contracts
claim.249 Lastly, in Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees
v. County of Sonoma, the California Supreme Court held that a law
eliminating wage increases to local government employees per a
contract agreement was an unconstitutional impairment of contract,
even though the law was enacted because of a fiscal emergency.2so
At the time that AB IX 26 was enacted, California was arguably
undergoing a fiscal crisis. However, it is unclear whether a court
would hold that the fiscal emergency qualifies as a public purpose
sufficient to justify contractual impairment. Unlike in Blaisdell,
where the impairment was only temporary and "limited to the
exigency that provoked the legislative response," the dissolution of
RDAs and the elimination of the security provisions are permanent.25'
Moreover, a fiscal emergency does not automatically allow the
Legislature to impair existing contractual obligations, as evidenced by
California courts' rejections of the State's defense in Valdes, Wilson,
and Sonoma County Organization. Also, the fiscal crisis does not
appear to be so severe that the state would be forced to shut down if
245. Id. at 444-47.
246. Valdes v. Cory, 139 Cal. App. 3d 773, 790-91 (1983).
247. See Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n of Newark, 310 U.S. 32, 39 (1940)
(upholding state statute even though it was not drafted at time of economic emergency).
248. Valdes, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 791.
249. Bd. of Admin. v. Wilson, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1109,1160-61 (1997).
250. Sonoma Cty. Org. of Pub. Emp. v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296, 310 (1979).
251. Id. at 306.
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the legislation did not pass.52 Here, the state has acknowledged that
the fiscal condition of California is recovering, albeit slowly, which
would weaken any argument that AB 1X 26 is for a public purpose.2
Therefore, it is unlikely that a fiscal crisis can serve as a basis for
constitutionally impairing a contract.
The impairment of contracts here could also be unconstitutional
because it is neither reasonable nor necessary for the public purpose.
The Court in U.S. Trust stated that necessity can be construed in two
ways: first, whether or not there is a "less drastic modification," and
second, whether or not the state could have "adopted alternative
means of achieving their . . . goals."2 4 Here, even if the fiscal crisis
resulted in fund shortages for schools and other important services,
the dissolution of RDAs and the elimination of tax increment funding
to fulfill contractual obligations were perhaps not the best solutions to
fix the problem. While AB 1X 26 certainly acts to channel funds to
important social services that lack funds, the Supreme Court will have
to consider whether alternative, less drastic means were considered to
raise funds for these important services, such as raising taxes or
eliminating costs in other areas. However, those alternatives would
likely be challenged given the unpopularity of taxes and eliminating
other services. One way out could be for the State to argue that it did
consider alternatives, such as passing AB 1X 27, but that was struck
down by the courts. Therefore, there were no other alternatives
other than eliminating the RDAs.
C. AB 1X 26: Enforceable Obligations
1. Timing Issues
Perhaps the most litigated issue concerning redevelopment
revolves around disagreements between the Department of Finance
and the successor agencies as to what constitutes an enforceable
obligation.!" Though the same analysis would be used to determine
whether the state has impaired contracts the former RDAs held with
private third parties, the main dispute here seems to be a factual
determination of whether the contracts fall under the statutory
252. See Subway-Surface Supervisors Ass'n v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 44 N.Y.2d 101
111-13 (1978) (holding that a statute deferring a wage increase in a collective bargaining
agreement did not violate the Contracts Clause because the fiscal emergency was so
severe that the city would cease to operate).
253. A.B. 1X 26,2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
254. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1977).
255. Miller, supra note 128.
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definition of "enforceable obligations." Whether an obligation is an
"enforceable obligation" under AB 1X 26 would likely involve an in-
depth analysis of the actual contract, including the terms, the type of
contract, and the pledges that were made. Therefore, the result for
each independent lawsuit may differ depending on the type of
obligation that was impaired.
Here, the lawsuits stem from the state's rejection of certain
"enforceable obligations" that were listed on the ROPS by the
successor agencies.256 One of the state's main contentions with this
issue is that the disputed enforceable obligations were unlawfully
made, even at their inception.257 AB 1X 26 prohibits the successor
agencies to incur "new or expand existing monetary or legal
obligations" after the effective date of the act, which was June 28,
2011.25 Those contracts that existed after June 28, 2011, are
considered "void from the outset and shall have no force or effect."259
Therefore, the main inquiry under this argument would be when the
enforceable obligations were created and what was the pledged
funding source in the contracts. If these contracts were created after
June 28, 2011, these "contracts" are not enforceable obligations under
AB 1X 26 and would not be entitled to funds from the RPTTF. If,
however, the contracts were entered into prior to June 28, 2011, the
state would enforce those obligations and use the funds from the
RPTTF to pay for such projects. Therefore, the dispute surrounding
these contractual obligations hinges on very particular details, such as
when the obligation was established, the type of enforceable
obligation that was created, the types of funds that were pledged
(such as general property taxes or tax increment), and the terms and
duration of the obligation and the pledge.
Lawsuits concerning enforceable obligations occupy most of the
redevelopment docket.260 Currently, it appears that there is neither a
clear definition nor consistent interpretation of what is considered an
"enforceable obligation" with respect to the timing of the obligation.
A current lawsuit exemplifies the confusion and inconsistent results
256. See League of California Cities Summary, supra note 10.
257. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant Director of
Finance Ana J. Matosantos' Demurrer to Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Petition
for Writ of Mandate at 5-6, County of Orange v. Matosantos, No. 34-2012-80001224 (Cal.
Super. Sept. 5, 2012).
258. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34161 (2012).
259. Id. § 34162(b) (2011).
260. See League of California Cities Summary, supra note 10 (detailing all the lawsuits
regarding redevelopment).
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caused by the lack of a proper definition. In a lawsuit against the
Department of Finance, Ana J. Matosantos, and the Orange County
Auditor-Controller, the plaintiff alleged the Department of Finance
found a settlement negotiation from 1984 to be an unenforceable
obligation."' The settlement negotiation promised that "20% of the
'tax increments or tax increments generated or related revenues, or
moneys repayable from tax increments' from the project area would
be 'set aside."' 26 2 The pledge of tax increment to pay indebtedness
would be in effect until July 6, 2035.263 The settlement agreement at
issue appears, on its face, to be an enforceable obligation, as defined
by AB 1X 26 because it is a "legally binding and enforceable
agreement or contract that is not otherwise void as violating the debt
limit or public policy."" Despite the fact that the settlement
agreement was created before the dissolution date, the trial court
ruled that the settlement agreement was not an enforceable
obligation.2 65 The trial court reasoned that finding the settlement
agreement to be an enforceable obligation would mean that the
settlement agreement "safeguards a continuing stream of funding for
additional redevelopment projects for the next twenty years, despite
the dissolution of the redevelopment agency," which could not have
been the intention of the Legislature.2 " The trial court further stated
that even if those were enforceable obligations, it could not allocate
future tax increment revenues.267 The court's interpretation appears
to go far beyond the enforceable obligations of AB 1X 26.
2. Creating New Obligations or Amending an Obligation
Another area of dispute surrounding the enforceability of an
obligation is whether the successor agency has created a new
obligation, or merely amended an existing obligation. In CRFL
Family Apartments, L.P. v. Matosantos, the issue was whether an
261. See generally Petition for Writ of Mandate and Verified Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Peebler v. Cal. Dep't of Fin., No. 34-2012-80001172
(Cal. Super. June 7, 2012).
262. Tentative Ruling: Final Judgment Denying Petition for Writ of Mandate at 4,
Peebler v. Cal. Dep't of Fin., No. 34-2012-80001172 (Cal. Super. Mar. 18,2013).
263. Id.
264. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Writ of
Mandate at 14, Peebler v. Cal. Dep't of Fin., No. 34-2012-80001172 (Cal. Super. Dec. 18,
2012). See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34171(d)(1) (2014).
265. Tentative Ruling, supra note 262, at 8.
266. Id. at 7.
267. Id. at 8.
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agreement made before the enforcement date of AB 1X 26, but then
later assigned to another organization after the enforcement date,
created a new obligation or amended an existing obligation." The
trial court ruled that it was not a new obligation, but rather a
permissible transfer, and therefore an enforceable obligation.269
Again, AB 1X 26 did not explicitly state that re-assigning former
obligations to a new agency would remain an enforceable obligation.
Thus, to reduce the number of lawsuits regarding enforceable
obligations, it would be necessary to further define and clarify what
an enforceable obligation is.
D. AB 1484: Diverting Sales and Use and Property Taxes
Currently, there is a split even within the state trial court as to
whether AB 1484 is unconstitutional. A plain reading of the penalties
provisions under AB 1484 would suggest a violation of the California
Constitution concerning sales and use tax revenue, and at least one
California trial court, in League of California Cities, et. al. v.
Matosantos, has reached that conclusion.270 However, trial courts have
also ruled otherwise by concluding that the penalties provision of AB
1484, is not unconstitutional.' In League of California Cities, the
trial court ruled that the sales and use penalties provision of AB 1484
violated the California Constitution because it changed the method of
distributing sales and use tax revenue.272 Under section 24(b) of
Article XIII of the California Constitution, it is impermissible for the
Legislature to "reallocate, transfer, borrow, appropriate, restrict the
use of, or otherwise use the proceeds of any tax imposed . .. solely for
the local government's purpose."273 The League of California Cities
court suggested that this section of the California Constitution
indicates a "total prohibition on the taking of local tax revenues for
268. Final Ruling at 3-4, CFRL Family Apartments, L.P., v. Matosantos, No. 34-2012-
80001354, (Jan. 17, 2013).
269. Id. at 5.
270. Ruling on Submitted Matter: Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and
Petition for Writ of Mandate, at 7-8, League of California Cities v. Matosantos, No. 34-2012-
80001275-CU-WM-GDS, (Dec. 9,2013) (ruling that AB 1484 provisions on sales and use tax
is unconstitutional but denying relief as to the property tax reduction provision).
271. Ruling on Submitted Matter, at 12, City of Bellflower v. Matosantos, No. 34-
2012-80001269, (Nov. 7, 2013).
272. Ruling on Submitted Matter, supra note 270, at 7, 9.
273. CAL. CONST. Art XIII, § 24(b) (2010).
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any reason," even for "remedial or penalty purposes."2 74  Here,
penalizing cities and counties by withholding, deducting and
offsetting a city's sales and use tax until the amount is paid is
unconstitutional under section 24(b) because it changes and restricts
the allocation of the sales and use tax revenue."'
While the trial court in League of California Cities ruled
otherwise, the property tax reallocation penalties also appear to
directly conflict with the California Constitution. Specifically, section
25.5 of Article XIII of the California Constitution prohibits the
Legislature from altering the "manner in which ad valorem property
tax revenues are allocated ... so as to reduce ... the percentage of
the total amount of those revenues that would be allocated." 27 6
Section 25.5 also prohibits the Legislature from changing the "pro
rata shares in which ad valorem property tax revenues are allocated
among local agencies" without a two-thirds vote.277 Offsetting or
deducting the city's property taxes when a successor agency fails to
pay the amount owed under AB 1484 would essentially reduce the
city's pro rata share or property taxes and impermissibly reallocate
the property taxes. Thus, there appears to be a clear conflict between
the penalty provisions of AB 1484 and the California Constitution.
However, a finding that the penalties from the True-Up Payment
Plan and the DDR payments directly conflict with sections 24(b) and
25.5 does not end the analysis because the Legislature has the broad
authority to impose civil penalties.278 Certainly, the Legislature has
the authority to impose civil penalties if the penalties are fair and
reasonably related to a proper legislative goal.279 Civil penalties have
been a commonly used tool in order to implement a statutory
policy.2 Here, the State argues that because it has the authority to
demand payments from the successor agencies, it also has the
274. Ruling on Submitted Matter, supra note 270, at 9. See also Update on Recent
Decisions Relating to the Dissolution of Redevelopment Agencies in California (April
2014), supra note 172, at 1.
275. See Ruling on Submitted Matter, supra note 270, at 7, 9 (purpose of Art. XIII, §
24(b) is to "conclusively and completely prohibit state politicians . . . from seizing,
diverting, shifting, borrowing, transferring, suspending, or otherwise taking or interfering
with revenues that are dedicated to funding services provided by local government" and
AB 1484 frustrates that purpose).
276. CAL. CONST § 25.5(a)(1)(A).
277. Id. § 25.5(a)(3).
278. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. App. 4th 210, 225 (2010).
279. Id.
280. Hale v. Morgan, 22 Cal. 3d 388, 398 (1978).
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authority to impose penalties to ensure compliance.281 Moreover,
since no penalties have been imposed thus far, plaintiffs carry a
higher burden when bringing a facial challenge. 2 Plaintiffs need to
show either that the statute poses a total and fatal conflict with
applicable constitutional prohibitions, or that the statute conflicts
with constitutional principles in general or in a great majority of
cases.23  Here, it is unlikely that plaintiffs could meet the facial
challenge because the provision is not unconstitutional in all or in a
majority of circumstances. As long as the successor agencies comply
with the statutory provisions, then the "unconstitutional" penalties
would not be imposed.
Additionally, central to the court's holding City of Bellflower was
the fact that the penalties provision does not upset the purpose of
Propositions 22 and 1A.' The intent of Proposition 1A is to ensure
that tax dollars are available for local purposes by disallowing the
state from "(1) shifting local tax revenues to schools or other state-
funded agencies, and (2) placing strict limits on the State's ability to
alter the allocation of tax revenues among local governments."m
Similarly, the purpose of Proposition 22 is to "restrict the State's
ability to temporarily borrow or redirect tax revenues dedicated for
transportation and local government services."a Because the
purpose of these two propositions is to reduce the state's ability to
limit local tax revenues, it does not directly contravene AB 1484.2
This is due to the fact that the penalties provisions in AB 1484 are
intended to restore "wrongfully-obtained funds," and not to limit
existing local funds.'
As to the property tax reallocations, the court noted that
Proposition 22 does not protect tax allocations to successor agencies
because Proposition 22 only applies to redevelopment agencies,
which have been dissolved." Thus, Proposition 22 has no sway in this
argument. However, given the increasing number of lawsuits
281. Ruling on Submitted Matter, supra note 271, at 11.
282. City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 4th 1, 10-11 (2002).
283. See In re Guardianship of Ann S., 45 Cal. 4th 1110, 1126 (2009).





289. Id. at 12.
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regarding this issue and the possibility for appeal, it is likely that this
issue will still be relevant to the redevelopment debate.
E. AB 1484: Violation of the Non-Delegation Doctrine
Lastly, another main area of contention is whether AB 1484
violates the non-delegation doctrine of the California Constitution.
Article III, section 3 of the California Constitution provides that the
"[p]ersons charged with the exercise of one power [(legislative,
executive, or judicial)], may not exercise either of the others except as
permitted by the Constitution."2 This non-delegation clause is
premised on the idea that the Legislature must "resolve the truly
fundamental issues."2 9' Plaintiffs challenging AB 1484 argue that it is
unconstitutional because it confers on an administrative agency
unrestricted authority to make or implement fundamental policy
decisions. 29 An unconstitutional delegation of authority occurs when
the legislative body "(1) leaves the resolution of fundamental policy
issues to others or (2) fails to provide adequate direction for the
implementation of that policy." 293  There need not be express
standards and "case law makes clear that the requisite standards ...
are [often] implied by the statutory purpose."2 94 Moreover, the real
concern behind the non-delegation doctrine is focused not on the
need for clear standards, "but for safeguards" against arbitrariness.295
At least one court, the trial court in League of California Cities, have
decided that AB 1484 does not violate the non-delegation doctrine.296
This decision makes sense given the arguments posed by the two
sides.
Opponents of AB 1484 argue that the law violates the non-
delegation doctrine in several ways, such as violating the doctrine's
second prong by failing to provide adequate direction for
implementing the policy. 2' First, AB 1484 provides that the
Department of Finance can unilaterally decide if it is feasible for the
successor agency to make DDR payments but does not provide any
standards as to how the Department of Finance should make its
290. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3 (2010).
291. People ex reL Lockyer v. Sun Pac. Farming Co., 77 Cal. App. 4th 619,632-33 (2000).
292. See Samples v. Brown, 146 Cal. App. 4th 787, 804 (2007).
293. Id. (citation omitted).
294. See id. at 805-06 (citation omitted).
295. Id. at 805 (citation omitted).
296. Ruling on Submitted Matter, supra note 270, at 12-14.
297. Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support, supra note 177, at 13.
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determination.298 The Department of Finance also has the authority
to decide the amount of DDR funds the successor agency has
available to divert to taxing entities.299 There are no enumerated
standards to guide the department in determining the proper amount,
other than the fact that it should consider any findings or opinions of
the county auditor-controller.' Additionally, the Department of
Finance has the unfettered discretion to reject certain enforceable
obligations from the ROPS with no explicit standard or guidance.30
Without enumerated guidelines, different individuals within the
Department of Finance can apply their own interpretations, thereby
leading to a wide disparity in results-and this is precisely what has
resulted.302 The fact that there are so many lawsuits concerning the
definition of an enforcement obligation reinforces the notion that
both AB 1X 26 and AB 1484 lack standards to guide the Department
of Finance in implementing its provisions.
In Samples v. Brown, the California Court of Appeal for the First
District considered what guidelines would be sufficient to meet the
second prong of the non-delegation doctrine."3 The issue in Samples
was whether a vehicle code provision violated the non-delegation
clause because there was no mechanism in place for an impounding
agency to follow in determining what constitutes a mitigating
circumstance under California Vehicle Code section 146 02 .6.30
Overturning the trial court, the court of appeal held that this
provision does, in fact, provide some guidance and it provided
examples as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance, such as the
owner's "lack of actual knowledge regarding the unlicensed status of
the driver.""' Furthermore, the court found reasonable safeguards in
298. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34179.6 (h)(3) (2012).
299. Id. § 34179.6(d).
300. Id.
301. Id. §§ 34177(m), 34179(h), 34182.5.
302. Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support, supra note 177, at 14.
303. Samples v. Brown, 146 Cal. App. 4th 787, 810 (2007).
304. Id. at 805. The California Vehicle Code provisions were aimed at impounding
vehicles driven by persons without valid licenses. Id. at 796. The provision challenged
under the non-delegation doctrine, section 14602.6(b), provided that "[t]he registered and
legal owner of a vehicle that is removed and seized under subdivision (a) or their agents
shall be provided the opportunity for a storage hearing to determine the validity of, or
consider any mitigating circumstances attendant to, the storage . . ." Id. The trial court
ruled that section 14602.6(b) violated the non-delegation doctrine because there is no
guidance for determining what a mitigating circumstance is, and would lead to varied and
inconsistent interpretations by law enforcement agencies. Id. at 798.
305. Id. at 805.
998 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 41:4
place for how the administrative agency is to determine what qualifies
as a mitigating circumstance.)' For example, the requirement that the
vehicle be "stored for 30 days absent a showing of mitigating
circumstances" is an important safeguard because it limits the
"authority of the enforcement agency" and puts the public on
notice.3" In addition, the purpose of the statute may provide insight
as to what standards should be used.3 08 In Samples, the court held that
the legislative purpose to punish and deter unlicensed driving is an
important standard and safeguard for administrative agencies to
consider when determining what constitutes a mitigating circumstance
under the statute. 9
Taking into consideration the court's analysis in Samples, it is
questionable whether the statutory provisions at issue in AB 1484
would be deemed unconstitutional for violating the non-delegation
doctrine. Certainly, the Legislature is able to task other branches of
government to carry out its "legislative will."310  Moreover, while
plaintiffs in these cases claim that the Legislature granted the
Department of Finance, an administrative agency, with unfettered
discretion and control to decide important statutory provisions, it may
be the case that there is still adequate guidance to help implement the
policy. Moreover, it is also questionable whether the authority rises
to the level of a fundamental policy decision. Similar to Samples, AB
1484's provisions, in and of themselves, do not constitute a
fundamental policy decision, but only serve as a mechanism to carry
out its legislative purpose-namely, to ensure that the appropriate
funds are properly returned to the taxing agencies that are in dire
need of funds."' The provisions at issue within AB 1484 are not
entirely without standards. Rather, the amount of guidance that
these provisions provide is similar to the minimal direction provided
in the vehicle code provisions in Samples. For instance, the provision
requiring the Department of Finance to determine the amount of
unobligated balances owed by the taxing agencies is first determined
by a licensed accountant employed by the successor agency.312 AB
1484 also sets out requirements that are to be included in the DDR,
306. Id. at 801-02.
307. Id. at 806.
308. See id. at 805-06.
309. Id.
310. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
311. A.B. 1484, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
312. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34179.5 (2012).
Summer 20141 ALIVE NOT DEAD 999
such as the "dollar value of assets transferred from the former
redevelopment agency to the successor agency," "expenditure and
revenue accounting information," "the dollar value of any cash or
cash equivalents," and "documentation of any enforceable
obligations.""' The Department of Finance could consider all of
these factors in addition to considering "any findings or opinions of
the county auditor-controllers and the Controller."314
There are also reasonable safeguards in place throughout AB
1484 to keep the power of the Department of Finance in check. As
provided in Samples, a reasonable safeguard could be as little as a
thirty-day requirement to store an impounded automobile."' Here,
AB 1484 allows the parties to dispute the determinations made by the
Department of Finance and it requires the Department to explain the
basis for its decisions.31 Thus, there are protections to prevent the
department from wielding complete authority.
Furthermore, the standards in place can be implied from the
statutory purpose and do not need to be explicitly stated.317 Here, the
purpose behind AB 1484 is to return funds that were preemptively
made to the successor agencies from the taxing agency, and this
purpose serves as a form of guidance for the Department of
Finance."' Because there is sufficient guidance as to what standards
the Department of Finance should follow under AB 1484, the
plaintiffs may have a difficult time arguing that AB 1484 is
unconstitutionally violative of the non-delegation doctrine. The
provisions of AB 1484 indicate that the decisions imparted on the
administrative agency are not a fundamental policy concern. Also, a
look into the legislative history of AB 1484 shows that there are
standards and safeguards in place. Thus, it is unlikely that plaintiffs
could prevail on a theory of a non-delegation doctrine violation.
California trial courts have reached the same conclusion.319
313. Id.
314. Id. § 34179.6.
315. Samples v. Brown, 146 Cal. App. 4th 787, 806 (2007).
316. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34179.6(d)-(e) (2012).
317. Samples, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 805-06.
318. A.B. 1484, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
319. See Ruling on Submitted Matter, supra note 270; Ruling on Submitted Matter,
supra note 271.
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Conclusion
While trial courts are starting to rule on redevelopment lawsuits,
the debate over redevelopment will only continue as a number of
redevelopment cases are currently pending before California
appellate courts.320 As these cases progress, one can expect more
decisions that will further shape California's redevelopment
landscape.
If the courts again rule against redevelopment, it may be
necessary to consider alternatives that would satisfy cities, counties,
and the state. While it is important to ensure that school districts and
other taxing agencies are properly funded, RDAs have been a vital
part of the California economic landscape. RDAs have also been
successful in generating property tax revenue for cash-strapped and
developing cities. Thus, it is imperative that some form of
redevelopment be restored. When developing a solution, however,
legislators should also be mindful of the impact it would have on
funding for other taxing entities. The challenge here would be to
rework it in a way that would satisfy cities as well as the state. In
response to the public outcry against the dissolution of
redevelopment agencies and the host of problems that have resulted
since then, several California legislators have proposed legislation to
further address the problems caused by AB 1X 26 and AB 1484.321
For example, AB 229, introduced in February 2013, would utilize
infrastructure financing districts, which would then allow "cities and
counties to issue bonds to fund public works projects" and would
finance projects in RDA project areas for up to forty years.322 This
would be subject to a two-thirds voter approval.323 Another Assembly
320. See League of California Cities Summary, supra note 10 (referencing cases that
are currently pending before the Third District Court of Appeal in California, including
but not limited to City of Cerritos v. California, No. C070484; City of Emeryville v.
Matosantos, No. C074186; Peebler v. Department of Finance, No. C073698); Martha
Bridegam, Brentwood files appeal on ruling that upheld post-redevelopment clawback,
CALIFORNIA PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT REPORT (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.cp-dr.
com/node/3478.
321. Stuart Waldman, VICA: California Needs Alternatives to Dissolved
Redevelopment Agencies, SAN CLARITA VALLEY SIGNAL (July 23, 2013), http://www.
signalscv.com/archives/101404/; Martha Bridegam, Post-Redevelopment Legislation Seeks
Direction, CALIFORNIA PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT REPORT (Apr. 29, 2014), http://
www.cp-dr.comlnode/3480 (for discussion on alternatives to redevelopment).
322. Id. See also A.B. 229, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
323. A.B. 229, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). This bill was ordered to the
"Inactive" file at the request of Assemblymember Toni Atkins on September 11, 2013.
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Bill, AB 243, is virtually identical to AB 229, but requires fifty-five
percent voter approval.324
It is difficult to think of a constitutional solution that would allow
redevelopment projects to survive without contravening important
constitutional provisions. AB 1X 27 would have been a compromise
because it allowed those cities interested in redevelopment agencies
to keep them, while infusing money into the state government. 325
Perhaps the best solution, however, would be to allow some form of
reformed redevelopment so that RDAs could not get a monopoly on
property taxes. Redevelopment should be further reformed to avoid
a repeat of previous abuses of redevelopment power.3 26 Due to the
growing number of redevelopment lawsuits on the court's docket,
there is no better time than now for the state to consider alternatives
to redevelopment or to further clarify or modify AB 1X 26 or AB
1484.
324. A.B. 243, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). This bill was ordered to the
"Inactive" file at the request of Assemblymember Toni Atkins on September 11, 2013. See also
Waldman, supra note 321.
325. See Cal. Redev. Ass'n v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th 231, 251 (2011).
326. William Fulton, Getting real about redevelopment in California, L.A. TIMES (Jan.
12, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/12/opinion/la-oe-fulton-redevelopment-2012
0112 (stating that redevelopment has been used "to do anything and everything because
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